The Rise of Robots and the Fall of Routine Jobs by de Vries, Gaaitzen J. et al.
 
 
 University of Groningen
The Rise of Robots and the Fall of Routine Jobs





IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2020
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
de Vries, G. J., Gentile, E., Miroudot, S., & Wacker, K. M. (2020). The Rise of Robots and the Fall of
Routine Jobs. Labour Economics, 66, [101885]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101885
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 26-12-2020
Labour Economics 66 (2020) 101885 
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
Labour Economics 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/labeco 
The rise of robots and the fall of routine jobs 
Gaaitzen J. de Vries a , ∗ , Elisabetta Gentile b , Sébastien Miroudot c , Konstantin M. Wacker a 
a Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, the Netherlands 
b Asian Development Bank, Philippines 
c Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Trade and Agriculture Directorate, France 










a b s t r a c t 
This paper examines the impact of industrial robots on jobs. We combine data on robot adoption and occupations 
by industry in thirty-seven countries for the period from 2005 to 2015. We exploit differences across industries 
in technical feasibility – defined as the industry’s share of tasks replaceable by robots – to identify the impact of 
robot usage on employment. The data allow us to differentiate effects by the routine-intensity of employment. 
We find that a rise in robot adoption relates significantly to a fall in the employment share of routine manual 























































Rapid improvements in robot capabilities have fuelled concerns
bout the implications of robot adoption for jobs. While the creation
f autonomous robots with flexible 3D movement continues to be a ma-
or challenge to engineers, rapid progress is being made. Robots can
ow perform a variety of tasks, such as sealing, assembling, and han-
ling tools. As robot capabilities continue to expand and unit prices fall,
rms are intensifying investment in robots ( Frey and Osborne, 2017 ;
raetz and Michaels, 2018 ; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020 ). What is the
mpact of robot adoption on labour demand? Do robots substitute for
asks previously performed by workers? 
The main contribution of this paper is to empirically study the im-
act of industrial robots on the occupational structure of the workforce
cross industries in a set of high-income as well as Emerging Market and
ransition Economies (EMTEs). We combine a large and detailed occu-
ations database with data on industrial robot deliveries from the Inter-
ational Federation of Robotics. The database on occupational employ-
ent from Reijnders and de Vries (2018) allows us to examine the share
f employment in occupations with a high content of routine tasks – i.e.
asks that can be performed by following a well-defined set of proce-
ures. We delineate occupations along two dimensions of the character-
stics of tasks performed, namely ‘analytic’ versus ‘manual’, and ‘routine’
ersus ‘non-routine’. 1 We thus distinguish four key occupational group-∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: g.j.de.vries@rug.nl (G.J. de Vries). 
1 The distinction between manual and analytic occupations is based on differ- 
nces in the extent of mental versus physical activity. h
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101885 
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vailable online 11 July 2020 
927-5371/© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access arngs, namely routine manual, routine analytic, non-routine manual, and
on-routine analytic task-intensive occupations (as in Autor et al. 2003 ;
eijnders and de Vries 2018 ; Cortes et al. 2020 ). We follow Graetz and
ichaels (2018) in constructing measures of robot adoption by country-
ndustry pairs and relate these to changes in occupational employment
hares. Our sample covers 19 industries for 37 countries at varying lev-
ls of development from 2005 to 2015, and includes major users of in-
ustrial robots, such as the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), Japan,
outh Korea, Germany, and the United States. Our main finding is that
ountry-industry pairs that saw a more rapid increase in robot adop-
ion experienced larger reductions in the employment share of routine
anual jobs. 
Our approach is motivated by the following economic considera-
ions. Firms produce a variety of products using a continuum of tasks
 Acemoglu and Autor, 2011 ), and these products differ in the number
f tasks that can be performed by robots ( Graetz and Michaels, 2018 ).
or example, the share of replaceable tasks by robots differs between
pparel and automotive and appears larger in the latter. 2 This gives rise
o differences across industries in the technical feasibility of robots substi-
uting tasks previously performed by humans. Advances in machine ca-
abilities expand the set of tasks carried out by machines ( Acemoglu and
estrepo, 2018 ). Firms will adopt robots if it is technically feasible and
he profit gains exceed the costs of purchasing and installing robots.
iven higher wages in advanced countries, the technical constraints to2 See e.g. the Economist, 24 August 2017, “Sewing clothes still needs human 
ands. But for how much longer? ”
 2020 
ticle under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 






















































































































3 Autor et al. (2003) examine the impact of computerization on labour de- 
mand in U.S. industries from 1960-1998. They find a positive relation between 
the demand for non-routine tasks and computerizing industries. Ross (2017) and 
De La Rica et al. (2020) study the impact of RBTC on the wage premium for job 
tasks. 
4 Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) find that robot adoption lowers labour de- 
mand in US local labour markets. Dauth et al. (2019) argue in an analy- 
sis for Germany that workers displaced by robots reallocate to services and 
there is no decline in aggregate employment. In a cross-country analysis, 
Ghodsi et al. (2020) find that robot adoption does not significantly affect ag- 
gregate employment, although the impact varies at the industry level. obots replacing tasks are more likely to bind for firms in these coun-
ries. Hence, improvements in robot capabilities would result in a larger
mployment response in advanced countries compared to developing
ountries. 
We use these economic insights in our analysis. In particular, the
echnical feasibility of adopting robots guides our instrumental variables
IV) strategy to identify the causal relation between robots and labour
emand. Economic feasibility motivates our distinction of the impact
f robot adoption between advanced and developing countries. Using
wo-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation, we find that robot adoption
owers the employment share of routine manual occupations. This rela-
ion is observed in high-income countries, but not in emerging market
nd transition economies. 
This paper relates to recent studies that examine the impact of robot
doption on socio-economic outcomes. Graetz and Michaels (2018) find
hat robot adoption contributed to an increase in productivity growth
cross industries in high-income countries between 1993 and 2007.
heir findings suggest that robot adoption did not reduce employ-
ent, which is corroborated in this paper. This is also observed by
auth et al. (2019) , but not by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) , who ex-
mine geographic variation in robot adoption across the United States
nd find that robots are labour replacing. Dauth et al. (2019) use de-
ailed linked employer-employee data for Germany to show that dis-
lacement effects are cancelled out by reallocation effects, such that in
he aggregate no employment effects from robot adoption are observed.
ata availability did not allow Graetz and Michaels (2018) to exam-
ne the impact of robots on workers that perform different tasks. Yet,
utor (2015) emphasizes that workers with routine task-intensive occu-
ations are most likely to be affected by automation. This paper aims to
ontribute to our understanding of the impact of robots on such occu-
ational shifts. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 re-
iews the key theoretical mechanisms between automation and labour
emand. Section 3 describes the methodology and instrumental vari-
bles. Section 4 documents patterns in the occupational structure of the
orkforce and robot adoption. Section 5 empirically studies the impact
f robot adoption on the task content of labour demand. Section 6 con-
ludes. 
. Theoretical framework 
This section starts with a discussion of robot adoption in the context
f a traditional capital-labour model. In this model, technology is factor-
ugmenting: it increases the efficiency of one of the production factors
mployed ( Acemoglu and Autor, 2011 ). The model puts the focus on
he complementarity and substitutability between robots and tasks per-
ormed by workers. We then describe recent modelling efforts that em-
hasize the ability of machines to replace workers in a widening range
f tasks ( Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018 ). These models help to clarify
echanisms by which robots may impact labour demand and motivate
ur empirical analysis. 
The models we describe analyse the impact of automation. Automa-
ion refers to computer-assisted machines, robotics, and artificial intel-
igence ( Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018 ). Thus, robots are a subset of
utomation. Robots are driven by algorithms, which have become in-
reasingly complex. They can now operate without requiring anyone to
xplicitly program the mechanisms of the tasks performed. Yet, not all
lgorithms drive a physical machine. In fact, many algorithms are em-
odied in devices or applications. Once these algorithms are designed,
hey can be used for many tasks anywhere and at any time. For robots,
he algorithms are embodied in the machines. Expanding the range of
asks performed by robots thus requires investing in robots, i.e. robots
re rival ( Martens and Tolan, 2018 ). This contrasts to algorithms, which
re non-rival in nature. Robots are more frequently studied in empiri-
al work because of the availability of statistics on their use. However,iven the properties of robotics, studies that use robot data capture only
art of the impact of automation on labour. 
In the traditional model, automation enhances the productiv-
ty of workers by complementing the tasks they perform (see e.g.
utor et al. 1998 ; Feenstra, 2008 ; Van Reenen 2011 ). Yet, for work-
rs who perform tasks that can be substituted by automation, increas-
ng availability of machines will lower their labour demand. Scholars
ave argued that new technologies tend to substitute for occupations
hat are intensive in routine tasks, such as assemblers, and complement
on-routine task-intensive occupations, such as managers and techni-
al scientists ( Autor et al. 2003 ; Van Reenen 2011 ; Goos et al. 2014 ;
auth et al. 2019 ). This is because for routine tasks, such as monitoring,
easuring, controlling, and calculating, there are well-specified proce-
ures which allow the task to be automated. Yet, knowing the rules
hat govern task procedures is not a trivial requirement. For many non-
outine tasks, such as those requiring creativity and problem-solving
kills, automation is difficult and rather complements the performance
f these tasks done by humans. In line with this reasoning, an analysis
or Western European countries by Goos et al. (2014) finds that recent
echnological progress has been replacing workers doing routine tasks.
his is referred to as “routine-biased technological change ” (RBTC). 3 
Predictions in the traditional model are straightforward. Firms adopt
obots if it is economically feasible to do so, which is the case when prof-
ts exceed purchasing and installation costs. Therefore, substitution of
obots for routine tasks is more likely in countries with higher wage lev-
ls, and there a fall in the fixed costs or the rental price will result in an
ncrease in robot adoption ( Graetz and Michaels, 2018 ). 
Recent modelling efforts by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) add a
istinctive feature of automation: the technical ability of machines to
eplace workers in a widening range of tasks. They split the production
rocess into tasks done by workers and machines. Advances in machine
apabilities expand the set of tasks carried out by machines and replace
abour, thus lowering labour demand. 
However, robotic automation technologies also result in the creation
f new tasks that cannot be done by machines, such as programming,
esign, and maintenance of high-tech equipment ( Acemoglu and Re-
trepo, 2019 ). This ‘re-instatement effect’ increases labour demand. The
ombination of tasks displaced by robots and the re-instatement of new
asks determine the reallocation of tasks between workers and machines.
Complementarity between man and machine in the Acemoglu and
estrepo (2018) model originates from two indirect effects that come
n top of complementarity effects in the traditional model ( Martens and
olan, 2018 ). The first is a price-productivity effect whereby robot
doption lowers prices of produced goods, leading the industry to ex-
and sales and increase its demand for labour. The second is a scale-
roductivity effect whereby lower aggregate goods’ prices enable the
local) economy to expand and thus also increase labour demand. The
verall impact of robotization on labour demand then depends on
hether the displacement or the complementary effects dominate. So
ar, empirical evidence on the aggregate employment effects from robo-
ization are inconclusive. 4 
In line with Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) , Graetz and
ichaels (2018) model the production process as a continuum of
asks. Yet, Graetz and Michaels (2018) assume that products differ







































































































8 The employment outcome of interest is either the average annual percent- 
age growth rate in employment by country-industry pair, which is estimated as 
((ln(EMP ci,2015 /EMP ci,2005 )) /10) 
∗ 100, or it is the change in the task-specific 
employment share by country-industry pair, measured as the share in 2015 mi- 
nus the share in 2005. 
9 Robot adoption is defined as the number of robots installed per thousand n the share of tasks that can be carried out by machines. Garments
rovide a clear example: sewing garments is a complex process that
equires human intuition and dexterity, which is difficult to program.
n contrast, it has proven easier to program robots to perform tasks
n automobile assembly lines. 5 Automation of car assembly lines has
elped to reduce error rates and enhances the control of repeatable
asks. The technical feasibility of machines taking over tasks thus differs
y industry. 
In this expanded model, the improvement of machine capabilities
ay drive automation. 6 That is, if robot adoption is constrained by
he production nature of certain industries, the rental price of robots
oes not matter. Rather, it is an expansion in machine capabilities that
ill drive automation. Given that labour costs are higher in advanced
conomies, the relaxing of technological constraints by expanding robot
apabilities will lead to higher economic incentives for robotization in
dvanced countries and hence stronger employment responses. 
The traditional and expanded model capture the key economic mech-
nisms driving robot adoption and their employment effects. The PRC is
n interesting case to illustrate how additional factors drive robot adop-
ion. Wage levels in China are below high-income countries, but it is
he world’s largest adopter of industrial robots ( Cheng et al. 2019 ). This
eems counterintuitive to the modelling of robot adoption. Yet, robot use
n China does coincide with rising wages and a slowdown in the growth
f its working-age population. Besides labour costs, concerns over prod-
ct quality and production expansion are found to influence decisions
y firms in adopting robots ( Cheng et al. 2019 ). In addition, the Chi-
ese government has initiated various programs and provides subsidies
hat encourage the development of the robotics industry ( Yang, 2017 ;
in, 2018 ). 
Robots may also reverse the trend to relocate fabrication activities
rom advanced towards low-wage countries. In an interesting contri-
ution, Faber (2018) points out that advances in robotics will reduce
roduction costs, no matter where the product is produced. That, he ar-
ues, will increase the attractiveness of producing domestically relative
o offshoring. In effect, workers in export sectors of developing countries
an be displaced by the adoption of robots, either onshore or offshore.
ssentially, foreign robots act as a form of competition on the export
arket. Using a methodological approach similar to Acemoglu and Re-
trepo (2020) , Faber (2018) finds that US robot adoption lowers labour
emand in Mexican export-producing sectors. 7 
These models inform the empirical analysis in our paper. The next
ections describe the methodology and data to examine the aggre-
ate (cross-country) implications of robotization. We view this analy-
is as a complementary approach to the within-country comparisons in
cemoglu and Restrepo (2020) , Dauth et al. (2019) , and Faber (2018) . 
. Methodology 
To examine the relation between robot adoption and changes in the
tructure of the workforce, we estimate regressions similar to those in
raetz and Michaels (2018) that take the form 
L ci = βΔRobot adoptionci + 𝐗 ′ci γ + δc + ε ci , (1)5 Clearly, some textile production can now also be nearly fully automated; an 
xample is the Adidas ’Speed factory‘ ( Faber, 2018 ). Yet, relatively speaking, 
he share of tasks that robots can perform varies across industries. 
6 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
7 If robots result in reshoring of a factory, this will affect all workers at the 
xporting plant in the developing country. Faber (2018) finds that Mexican 
orkers in commuting zones most affected by U.S. robots are low-educated ma- 
hine operators and technicians in manufacturing and high-educated workers in 
anagerial and professional occupations. Using the World Input-Output Tables, 
renz et al. (2018) find evidence for a positive relation between reshoring and 













here ∆L ci is the change in the employment outcome of interest in in-
ustry i of country c . 8 ∆Robot adoption ci is the change of the robot
tock relative to labour input in each country-industry pair. 9 Most spec-
fications include control variables which are changes in: investment to
alue added ratios, and (the natural logarithm of) value added. We also
xamine results controlling for the adoption of information and com-
unication technologies (discussed below). 𝛿c represents country fixed
ffects, which in a first-difference equation are equivalent to country-
pecific time trends in a levels’ equation. Regressions are estimated in
ong-run changes between 2005 and 2015 because we are interested in
onger-term trends. The regressions weight industries using their 2005
mployment shares within each country. This ensures that estimates re-
ect the importance of industries within countries, but we give equal
eight to countries in the analysis (as e.g. in Graetz and Michaels, 2018 ).
e use heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors that are two-way clus-
ered by country and industry. 10 This is a conservative approach because
he resulting standard errors are typically larger compared to one-way
lustering by country or industry. 
.1. Endogeneity concerns and 2SLS estimation 
Estimating (1) using OLS raises several concerns about endogeneity.
irst, one might worry about reverse causality and omitted variable bias.
or instance, industries that experience a faster growth in product de-
and may invest more in robots. Especially if the labour market is tight,
 positive demand shock is more likely to result in investment in robots
ather than an expansion of employment ( Faber, 2018 ). 11 This is a case
f reverse causality, because lower employment growth results in higher
obot adoption. Also, relevant variables might be omitted from the re-
ression analysis. For instance, Harrigan et al. (2016) find that adoption
f new technologies is mediated by technically qualified workers. Sec-
nd, one may worry about attenuation bias of 𝛽 in (1) due to measure-
ent error in the variable robot adoption. Clearly, the available data
n robot adoption, discussed in Section 4.1 , is imperfect, as it does not
nform on the quality and other characteristics of robots installed. In
ddition, we estimate regression specifications in changes, which may
orsen the signal-to-noise ratio compared to regressions of variables in
evels. Due to measurement error, the variable robot adoption could be
orrelated with the error term 𝜀 ci and OLS estimation of 𝛽 would be bi-
sed downwards. Finally, industries that adopt robots may differ from
ther industries in non-random ways, which would also bias the coeffi-
ient if not appropriately controlled for. Hence, the direction of bias in
is not clear a priori, although the previous literature suggests that a
ownward bias in OLS is more likely (e.g. Graetz and Michaels, 2018 ). 
In an attempt to address these endogeneity concerns, we
se two industry-specific instruments introduced by Graetz andersons employed. We follow Graetz and Michaels (2018) and use the percentile 
ank of the change in robot adoption as our main explanatory variable. This is 
urther elaborated upon in Section 4.1 . 
10 We implement Stata’s ‘ivreg2’ command for OLS and 2SLS regressions. Two- 
ay clustered standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and 
ntra-group correlation within each of the two (non-nested) categories “coun- 
ry ” and “industry ” ( Cameron et al. 2012 ). This allows for robust inference, 
or example, if errors are correlated within countries (e.g. due to unobserved 
ountry-specific policies) and have separate correlation structures within indus- 
ries (e.g. due to technology shocks). 
11 In his analysis of the Mexican labour market, Faber (2018) points out that a 
ositive demand shock due to the North American Free Trade Agreement may 
ave put upward pressure on industries or local labour markets to adopt robots 
f they had less room to expand employment. 




































































































16 Purchases of services robots are only available for recent years and few coun- 
tries, which limits studying the impact on task demand of robot adoption in 
services sectors. 
17 Program code to replicate the analysis is available from the authors upon 
request. 
18 The perpetual inventory method to build robot stocks is: RS ci,t = (1- 
d) ∗ RS ci,t-1 + RD ci,t , where RS is the robot stock of industry i in country c at 
time t ; RD are robot deliveries, and d is the depreciation rate. Our main results 
are robust to building the robot stock using a 5 and a 15 percent depreciation ichaels (2018) and estimate (1) using 2SLS. 12 The first instrument
easures the share of each industry’s labour input that is replaceable
y robots . This instrument is constructed using information on the tasks
erformed by robots ( IFR, 2012 ). As discussed above, the extent of robo-
ization for each task could be endogenous to industry conditions. There-
ore, Graetz and Michaels (2018) use information on US occupations in
ach industry from the 1980 census, which dates back before the rise of
obots. Occupations are defined as ‘replaceable’ if (part of) their tasks
ould have been replaced by robots in 2012. They then compute the
raction of hours worked in each industry in 1980 that was performed
y occupations that subsequently became more prone to replacement
y robots. This instrument is not without limitations: it is based on data
rom the US and labour shares might therefore be different if constructed
sing data from other countries. 13 
The second instrument is motivated by rapid improvements in the
bility of robotic arms to perform ‘reaching and handling’ tasks. It mea-
ures the prevalence of occupations in each industry that require reach-
ng and handling tasks compared to other physical demands in 1980, prior
o robot adoption. Robotic arms are a salient characteristic of robots,
nd much technological advances are linked to the development of these
obotic arms ( Graetz and Michaels, 2018 ). It is therefore more likely that
obotic arms are a technological characteristic of robots, less driven by
he demand side (due to industries’ task requirements), which could re-
ect reverse causality. This instrument is constructed using the extent
o which occupations in each US industry require reaching and handling
asks compared to other physical tasks in 1980. 14 Similar limitations as
o the first instrument apply here, but one may argue that this instru-
ent is less likely to violate the exclusion restriction. 
Clearly, neither instrument can guarantee to resolve all endogene-
ty concerns. Both instruments reflect variation across industries in the
hare of tasks that are potentially replaceable by robots, which may cor-
elate with other changes over time. Nevertheless, the instruments are
elpful to contrast OLS with 2SLS results. 
. Data and descriptive analysis 
We first describe the data on robots and occupations in Section 4.1 .
escriptive statistics are presented in Section 4.2 . 
.1. Occupations and robots 
We combine two datasets with information on occupations and robot
urchases. The first dataset with occupational employment by country-
ndustry originates from Reijnders and de Vries (2018) and was updated
y Buckley et al. (2020) . The data is constructed using detailed survey
nd census data from statistical offices for the period from 2000 to 2015.
he sources used in constructing this dataset closely align with those
rom other studies. 15 The dataset provides employment for thirteen oc-
upational groupings by country-industry pairs. It covers 40 countries,
amely the 27 members of the European Union (per January 2007), Aus-
ralia, Brazil, Canada, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, the PRC, Russia,
outh Korea, Chinese Taipei, Turkey and the United States. For each12 The instruments are computed for 2-digit industries in the ISIC revision 3 
lassification, which matches with the industry information on robot stocks and 
ccupational employment shares presented in Section 4.1 . Note that the instru- 
ents do not vary across countries but only across industries. 
13 Also note the replacement values are an upper bound because occupations 
re considered to be replaceable even if only part of their work can be replaced 
y robots. 
14 Information on the task content of occupations is taken from the Dictionary 
f Occupational Titles. 
15 For example, for the U.S., the sources are the 2000 Census and the annual 
merican Community Surveys. These sources are also used in Autor (2015) . 
ata for European countries are from the harmonized individual level European 















f these countries, occupational employment shares by 35 ISIC revision
.1 industries that cover the overall economy are distinguished. They
nclude 14 two-digit manufacturing industries (such as textile manu-
acturing and electronics manufacturing), as well as agriculture, min-
ng, construction, utilities, finance, business services, personal services,
rade and transport services, and public services industries. The dataset
hus has dimensions of 13 occupational groupings × 35 industries × 40
ountries × 16 years. Occupation data is intrinsically not exactly compa-
able across countries, and in practice will also vary due to differences
n the type of sources and national data collection practices. Intertempo-
al changes within country-industries are likely more consistent because
eijnders and de Vries (2018) use data from the same national source
or each country. Our empirical analysis exploits this within-country
ariation. 
We examine the impact of robot adoption on tasks, which we dis-
inguish into routine versus non-routine and manual versus analytic
asks. Our measurement strategy is to infer the impact of robot adop-
ion on tasks from data on the occupational structure of the workforce.
he distinction between occupations with different task intensities is
ased on the so-called Routine Task Intensity (RTI) index developed by
utor et al. (2003) and mapped into the International Standard Classifi-
ation of Occupations (ISCO 88) by Goos et al. (2014) . Table 1 provides
he allocation of occupational groupings to tasks. 
The second database includes deliveries of industrial robots by
ountry-industry from the International Federation of Robotics (IFR). 16 
he IFR provides country data on the number of industrial robots de-
ivered from 1993 onwards. Yet coverage varies and the breakdown
f robot investment by country-industry is only consistently available
or most countries after 2004. In addition, robot investments increased
apidly during the 2000s. We therefore build the dataset using informa-
ion for all available years but focus on the period from 2005 to 2015
n the empirical analysis. 17 
We use the perpetual inventory method to build robot stocks, assum-
ng a depreciation rate of 10% as in Graetz and Michaels (2018) . 18 We
hen define ‘robot densification’ or simply ‘robot adoption’ as the robot
tock per thousand persons employed. We examine changes in robot
doption over time. The distribution of changes in robot adoption for
he country-industries included in our analysis has mostly either zero or
mall positive values, with a long right tail. Analysing raw changes in
obot density is therefore not recommendable and we use the percentile
f changes in robot adoption (based on the employment-weighted dis-
ribution of changes) as in Graetz and Michaels (2018) . 19 ate. 
19 We follow Graetz and Michaels (2018) and calculate within- 
ountry employment-weighted distributions of changes in robot 
doption between 2005 and 2015. We use the Stata code 
hat Graetz and Michaels (2018) made available at https:// 
ataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId = doi:10.7910/DVN/5JWBXU . 
pecifically, we denote robot adoption by RA ci,t = RS ci,t /EMP ci,t , i.e. the robot 
tock per thousand persons employed in industry i of country c . We denote ws c 
he weighted change in robot adoption of country c , which is the summation of 
hanges in robot adoption by industry i weighted by their employment shares. 
he change in robot adoption net of the weighted change in robot adoption 
s ΔRA ci = (RA ci,t - RA ci,t-1 ) - ws c . We then calculate the percentile rank of 
he change in robot adoption ( ΔRA ci ) and use this variable in the regression 
nalysis. The use of percentiles is common in the economics literature and 
elpful when the data is skewed, see for example Autor et al. (2003) . 
G.J. de Vries, E. Gentile and S. Miroudot et al. Labour Economics 66 (2020) 101885 
Table 1 
Mapping occupations to tasks. 
Routine Non-routine 
Manual Production workers (71-74, 81-82, 93) Agricultural 
workers (61-62, 92) Others (01, 999) 
Support-services workers (51, 910, 912-916) Drivers (83) 
Analytic Administrative workers (41-42) Legislators (11) Managers (12-13) Engineers (21, 31) Health professionals 
(22, 32) Teaching professionals (23, 33) Other professionals (24, 34) Sales 
workers (52, 911) 
Notes : Mapping of thirteen occupations from Reijnders and de Vries (2018) to four different groups based on Autor et al. (2003) and Goos et al. (2014) . Numbers 
in brackets refer to International Standard Classification of Occupations codes (ISCO 88). 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics. 
Obs. Mean SD p5 p95 
Dependent variables 
Employment growth (average annual, in %) 700 -0.78 3.41 -6.0 3.9 
Δ Routine employment share 700 -0.04 0.10 -0.2 0.1 
Δ Routine manual employment share 700 -0.04 0.12 -0.2 0.1 
Δ Routine analytic employment share 700 -0.00 0.05 -0.1 0.1 
Δ Non-routine manual employment share 700 -0.00 0.06 -0.1 0.1 
Δ Non-routine analytic employment share 700 0.04 0.10 -0.1 0.2 
Independent variables 
Percentile of changes in robot adoption 700 0.50 0.29 0.0 1.0 
Robot adoption, 2005 700 2.23 10.17 0.0 10.5 
Robot adoption, 2015 700 4.98 22.54 0.0 21.1 
Δ Investment to value added ratio 700 0.02 0.69 -0.2 0.2 
Δ (natural logarithm of) value added 700 0.21 0.60 -0.7 1.1 
Percentile of changes in information technology adoption 277 0.51 0.29 0.0 1.0 
Percentile of changes in communication technology adoption 277 0.50 0.30 0.0 1.0 
IV: Reaching and handling tasks 700 0.45 0.05 0.3 0.5 
IV: Replaceable tasks 700 0.25 0.12 0.0 0.4 
Notes : A ‘ Δ’ in front of a variable refers to the change between 2005 and 2015. For variable descriptions, 
see Section 4.1 . In the columns, ‘obs’ refers to the number of observations, SD the standard deviation, p5 












































We match the data on robot adoption with occupational employ-
ent. 20 The nineteen sectors that are matched are 14 manufacturing in-
ustries, agriculture, mining, utilities, construction, and ‘education and
&D’. The (unweighted) average employment share of these sectors in
he total economy across the sampled countries is 46% and 39% in 2000
nd 2015, respectively. The share varies across levels of development.
t is about a quarter of the workforce in advanced countries such as
enmark, the Netherlands, and the United States throughout the sam-
le period. It is over 50% of total persons employed in industrializers
uch as the PRC, Turkey, and Poland. 
In most regression specifications, we control for changes in the in-
estment to value added ratios, and (the natural logarithm of) value
dded. 21 Although robots are a visible and much discussed form of20 After matching the datasets, we have data for 37 countries and 19 sec- 
ors, with missing data for a few country-industry pairs. High-income coun- 
ries include the ‘old’ EU15 countries, western offshoots, and high-income East 
sian countries, namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Den- 
ark, Spain, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
outh Korea, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Chinese Taipei, and the 
nited States. EMTEs are the others, namely Brazil, the PRC, Czech Republic, 
stonia, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Lithuania, Latvia, Mexico, Poland, Romania, 
ussia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey. 
21 This data is obtained from the WIOD 2016 release ( Timmer et al. 2015 ). 
he first control variable, investment to value added ratios may be subject to 
oncerns about multi-collinearity as robots are part of physical capital invest- 
ent. We explored the share of robot investment in overall investment by using 
urnover-based prices of robots for the US provided in IFR (2012) . The number 
f robot times their unit price gives a rough approximation of nominal invest- 
ent. Our estimates suggest that the share of robot investment in total invest- 
ent is small, typically not exceeding 1 percent. The first differences of our 
ata for robot adoption and investment to value added ratios are only loosely 
















t  utomation, computers and other digital technologies impact jobs as
ell. Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have been
ound to be skill-biased , raising the productivity of high-skilled work-
rs and lowering demand for low-skilled workers ( Feenstra 2008 ;
ichaels et al. 2014 ). In contrast, robots are part of recent innovations
nd considered routine-biased , as they substitute for workers performing
outine-manual tasks ( Goos et al. 2014 ). These routine tasks are often
erformed by workers with a middling level of education, such as fab-
ication jobs involving repetitive production tasks ( Autor, 2015 ). We
herefore expect a direct effect of robot adoption on the demand for
outine-manual task-intensive occupations independent of ICT invest-
ent. 
To control for ICT adoption, we use data from the EU KLEMS Release
019 for gross fixed capital formation in computing and communication
quipment ( Stehrer et al. 2019 ). These ICT investments are expressed as
 share in total investment. Changes in the ICT investment share are in-
luded in the analysis, also in the form of the percentile of changes in ICT
doption (based on the employment-weighted distribution of changes).
.2. Descriptive analysis 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of our key dependent and ex-
lanatory variables. The top rows show changes in employment shares
or occupations by task intensity. On average, the routine (manual)
mployment share declined by 4 percentage points between 2005 and
015. This trend is observed in 35 out of 37 countries, but the decline
n the routine share differs across countries and industries. This can be
een in Appendix Figs. 1 and 2 , which depict the changes in employment
hares for our four occupational groupings by country and industry, re-
pectively. The decline in routine manual occupations is mirrored by
he rise of non-routine analytic jobs, which increased by 4 percentage
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Fig. 1. Robots and the routine employment share. 
Notes : Observations are country-industry cells. The size of each circle corresponds to an industry’s 2005 within-country employment share. Vertical axis displays 
the change in the routine employment share between 2005 and 2015. Horizontal axis of panel (a) shows the percentile of changes in robot adoption (based on the 
employment-weighted distribution of changes), see Section 4.1 . Panel (b) changes in robot adoption (based on the employment-weighted distribution of changes). 































































o  oints on average. 22 The comparability of the shifts in routine manual
nd non-routine analytic occupations across our sample of high-income
ountries and EMTEs makes it likely that a common set of forces con-
ributes to shared developments in labour markets. The prime suspect
s automation ( Autor, 2015 ). At the same time, variation in country-
pecific experiences underscores that no common cause will explain the
ull diversity of labour market developments across these economies. 
The average robot stock per thousand persons employed more than
oubled from 2.23 in 2005 to 4.98 in 2015. The standard deviation of
obotization reveals substantial variation in robotization across coun-
ries and industries. Most of this variation stems from cross-industry dif-
erences within countries as opposed to variation between countries. 23 
ore robots were installed in all countries, with the number of robots
er thousand persons employed surging in Germany, Japan, and South
orea (see Appendix Fig. A3 ). 24 High robot density is observed in ma-
hinery, electronics, and automotive (see Appendix Fig. A4 ). For indus-
ries that produce chemicals and metal products we also observe an in-
rease in robot density, albeit starting from low levels. 
Appendix Fig. A5 shows the number of robots per 1,000 persons
mployed by industry in the PRC and Germany for 2015. This figure
elps clarify the lower level of robots per thousand persons employed in
hina. For example, in 2015, the number of robots installed in China’s
utomotive industry was about 50,000, which compares to a slightly
ower number of around 48,500 robots in that industry for Germany.
et, in 2015 the number of persons employed in automotive is about
.8 million in China compared to 965 thousand in Germany, so a fac-
or 7 difference in the size of the workforce in that industry. Hence the22 Changes in the shares of routine analytic and non-routine manual jobs are 
ypically smaller and we observe substantial variation across countries (see Ap- 
endix Fig. A1 ). 
23 The standard deviation of the robot stock per thousand employed between 
ountries is 8.06 in 2015. In comparison, the standard deviation of robot adop- 
ion within countries is 21.06 in 2015. Those are calculated, respectively, as 
he standard deviations of country means 𝑥 𝑐 and of their deviations 𝑥 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑥 𝑐 + 𝑥 , 
here x indicates robot adoption and 𝑥 is its global average. 
24 For Japan, reported deliveries and stocks of robots changed over time due 
o a reclassification of machines as robots ( Graetz and Michaels, 2018 ). In 











umber of robots installed per thousand persons employed is about 7 in
hina compared to 50 in Germany. 
Table 2 also provides descriptive statistics for the instruments and
ontrol variables. The instruments replaceable tasks and reaching and han-
ling tasks are positively correlated, but different. 25 For example, the
ighest share of replaceable tasks is observed in automotive and metal
anufacturing, whereas the extent of reaching and handlings tasks is
ighest in textile and food manufacturing. 
Fig. 1 plots the change in the routine employment share against mea-
ures of increased robot use. In sub-figure (a), we plot the percentile of
he change in robot density net of country trends on the horizontal axis,
s well as the fitted regression line. The slope is negative and statistically
ignificant. The distribution of data points around the fitted line suggest
hat the relationship between the routine share and the percentile of
obot densification is well approximated by a linear functional form. In
ubfigure (b), we instead plot changes in robot density on the horizontal
xis (again net of country trends), together with the fitted line. Here a
inear functional form (though also negative and significant at conven-
ional levels) seems much less adequate, and the estimated slope appears
ensitive to several outlying observations near the top of the distribu-
ion of robot densification. Thus, following Graetz and Michaels (2018) ,
n the regression analysis we will use the percentile of changes in robot
ensification. 
Panel (a) of Fig. 2 shows a descriptive relation between robot adop-
ion and industry average changes in the routine employment share be-
ween 2005 and 2015 (see Table A1 for the industry descriptions). We
bserve a (slightly) stronger reduction in the routine share for industries
hat invested more in robots. Sectors such as paper and utilities experi-
nced a decline in the share of routine jobs with only a relatively small
ncrease in robotization. In manufacturing industries such as machinery,
lectronics, and automotive, we observe a decrease in the share of rou-
ine jobs. These industries are also among the ones with the strongest
ncrease in robot adoption. Panels (b) and (c) suggest both instruments
re good predictors, as industries with a higher share of replaceable
asks or those more intensive in reaching and handling tasks have in-25 Note the instruments are measured by industry based on data for the US (see 
ection 4.1 ) and matched to the country-industry pairs. 
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Fig. 2. Cross-industry variation in IVs and changes in the routine employment 
share. 
Notes : On the horizontal axis is the (unweighted) average percentile of changes 
in robot adoption by industry. In panel (a), the vertical axis shows the indus- 
try (unweighted) average change in the routine employment share between 
2005 and 2015. The coefficient (standard error) of the linear fit in panel (a) 
is -0.013(0.007). The vertical axis of panels (b) and (c) show the values for 
the instruments, coefficients (standard errors) of the linear fit are respectively 





























































talled more robots compared to others. The next section formally tests
hese relationships. 
. Econometric results 
We present our main results from OLS and 2SLS regressions in
ection 5.1 . We find that robot adoption relates to a decline in the
mployment share of occupations with a high content of manual rou-
ine tasks. In Section 5.2 we present several extensions and robustness
hecks. We first document that results appear neither driven by specific
ectors or countries nor spurious industry trends. We then exploit het-
rogeneity in task intensity across (blue-collar) production workers and
nd that robot adoption relates to declining demand for occupations
hat are more intensive in routine tasks. Finally, we explore whether
lobal developments in robotization impact labour demand in EMTEs. 
.1. Main OLS and 2SLS results 
Our main regression results are summarized in Table 3 , with OLS
esults in panel A and 2SLS results in panel B. We start the analysis
y regressing the average annual percentage growth of employment on
obot adoption. Country fixed effects are included; thus, coefficients are
dentified from variation across industries. We use a conservative two-
ay clustering of standard errors at the country and industry level. Col-
mn 1 of Table 3 indicates that robot adoption is negatively correlated
ith the average growth rate of employment between 2005 and 2015.
owever, this relationship is not statistically different from zero. It sug-
ests robot adoption is not labour replacing, which was also observed
y Graetz and Michaels (2018) . Our finding indicates this result holds
n a larger country sample. 
In column (2) of Table 3 , we examine the relation between robot
doption and the share of routine jobs. We find that increased robot
se contributes to a decline in the routine employment share. To assess
he economic magnitude, consider the difference between an industry
ith a median trend in robot adoption and an industry with no robot
doption, which equals 0.5 x -0.047 = -0.02 in the OLS regression. This
ifference amounts to about 59% of the average change in the routine
mployment share (which is -0.04, see Table 2 ). While this indicates a
izeable impact of robots on occupational shifts, the R-squared of 2%
n column (2) where country fixed effects are partialled out, indicates
hat many other factors than robot adoption affect changes in the share
f routine jobs. The coefficient more than doubles in the 2SLS regres-
ion, where we use the share of replaceable tasks in industries as an
nstrument (panel B, column 2). The instrument is positively and sta-
istically significantly correlated with robot adoption in the first stage,
hich is reported in column (4) of panel B. Identification is strong, with
he Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic (268.53, assuming i.i.d. errors) and
he Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic (23.42) surpassing the 10% critical value
16.38). Under-identification is rejected at the 5% level of statistical sig-
ificance. The considerable increase in the estimated second stage co-
fficient for robot adoption, when compared to OLS results, may reflect
easurement error in our main explanatory variable: an increase in the
oise-to-signal ratio in robot adoption will bias OLS estimates towards
ero. Moreover, the increase in the coefficient in 2SLS estimates may re-
ect that our instrument for robot adoption only varies across industries
nd that global industry trends impact changes in routine employment
hares (see Section 5.2 below). Using ‘reaching and handling’ tasks as
n instrument gives similar results, although more prone to weak iden-
ification concerns (see Appendix Table A2 ). 
An advantage of our dataset is the broad country coverage, including
arious emerging market and (post-) transition economies. In column
3) of Table 3 , we differentiate the relation between robot adoption and
outine shares across high-income countries and EMTEs. 26 We do so by26 Given the number of robots installed in the PRC, it might be less appropriate 
o classify it as an EMTE. To check for robustness of reported results, we omitted 
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Table 3 
Baseline regression results of employment growth and change in routine employment share. 
Panel A: OLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Δ Employment Δ Routineemployment share Δ Routineemployment share Percentile of changes in robot adoption 
Percentile of changes in robot 
adoption 
-0.354 -0.047 ∗∗∗ -0.055 ∗∗∗ 
(0.73) (0.02) (0.02) 
Percentile of changes in robot 
adoption x dummy EMTE 
0.040 ∗∗∗ 
(0.02) 
R 2 0.001 0.025 0.028 
Observations 700 700 700 
Number of countries 37 37 37 37 
Panel B: 2SLS (IV: Replaceable 
tasks) 
Percentile of changes in robot 
adoption 
-2.714 -0.120 ∗∗ -0.156 ∗∗ 
(3.03) (0.05) (0.06) 
Percentile of changes in robot 
adoption x dummy EMTE 
0.136 ∗∗ 
(0.06) 
Replaceable tasks 0.892 ∗∗∗ 
(0.18) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 268.53 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 23.42 
Kleibergen-Paap under 
identification test ( p -value) 
0.013 
R 2 -0.052 -0.027 -0.053 
Observations 700 700 700 700 
Number of countries 37 37 37 37 
Notes : Robust standard errors in parentheses. Multi-way clustering by country and industry. The dependent variable employment growth in column (1) is the 
average annual percentage growth in employment for the period from 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable in columns (2)-(3) is the change in the routine 
employment share between 2005 and 2015. Column (4) reports the first stage for 2SLS estimation. The share of replaceable tasks in an industry is used as an 
instrument for robot adoption. Regressions include the change in the investment to value added ratio and the change in (the log of) value added between 2005 
and 2015 as control variables. Country fixed effects are included in all regressions and partialled out in the reported R 2 . 
∗ p < 0.1. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01 









































t  nteracting a dummy variable for EMTEs with robot adoption. 27 The re-
ationship between robot adoption and declining routine shares appears
o mainly occur in high-income countries: for both, the OLS and 2SLS
egressions, the negative overall coefficient estimate for robot adoption
n column (3) is almost equal in size to the positive interaction term
ith the EMTE dummy, indicating that the effect of robot adoption is
ssentially nullified in those countries. 28 Since technical constraints to
obots replacing tasks are more likely to bind for firms in high-wage
dvanced countries, improvements in robot capabilities might account
or the larger employment response in advanced countries compared to
MTEs. 
Additionally, our dataset allows us to further disaggregate routine
nd non-routine employment shares into manual and analytic task-
ntensive occupations. Results are reported in Table 4 , again with OLS
esults in panel A and 2SLS results in panel B. 29 We find that the neg-
tive relation between robot adoption and routine employment shares
s exclusively driven by manual routine jobs: the estimates in columnhina from the sample and re-classified it as a non-EMTE. This did not alter the 
esults (available upon request). 
27 In the reported 2SLS regressions, we only instrument robot adoption but not 
he interaction. We additionally estimated 2SLS regressions with the interac- 
ion instrumented, which required interaction of our instrument with an EMTE 
ummy in the first stage. Results, which are available upon request, were quan- 
itatively and qualitatively similar to those reported, but more prone to weak 
dentification concerns. 
28 OLS and 2SLS estimates of 𝛽 are not statistically significantly different from 
ero when estimating equation (1) for EMTEs only. Results are available upon 
equest. 












a  1) of Table 4 essentially mimic those of column (2) in Table 3 , while
o relationship can be found between robot adoption and analytic rou-
ine employment shares ( Table 4 , column 2). It thus appears robots are
etter suited to substitute for routine-manual tasks due to the ability
f robots to manipulate objects. Conversely, the share of non-routine
nalytic occupations positively relates to robot adoption (column 4).
his is consistent with the intuition that non-routine analytic tasks are
omplemented by robots in production ( Autor, 2015 ). No relevant rela-
ionship is observed between robot adoption and changes in the manual
on-routine employment share (column 3). 
.2. Robustness and extensions 
We performed several robustness checks. These are summarized
n Section 5.2.1 . The other Sections focus on aspects considered rele-
ant to better understand the relation between robotization and rou-
ine employment shares and to motivate future research in this area.
ection 5.2.2 examines the relation between robot adoption across pro-
uction occupations that differ in task intensity. Section 5.2.3 examines
hether the results are driven by longer-term industry trends. Finally,
ection 5.2.4 explores the role of global industry trends in robot adop-
ion for driving country-industry changes in employment shares. 
.2.1. Robustness and heterogeneity 
We first examine regression results when adding ICT investment to
he analysis. This is because computers seem particularly suited to sub-
titute for analytic tasks and the development of computer and com-
unication equipment is not independent of robot adoption, such that
mitting ICT may bias the coefficient for robot adoption. Including vari-
bles for computer and communication investment leads to a consider-
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Table 4 
Robot adoption and changes in employment shares by task type. 
Panel A: OLS 









Percentile of changes in robot 
adoption 
-0.049 ∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.008 0.055 ∗∗∗ 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) 
Δ Investment to value added ratio 0.003 ∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 ∗∗∗ 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Δ (natural logarithm of) value 
added 
0.005 0.002 0.004 -0.009 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
R 2 0.024 0.003 0.007 0.031 
Observations 700 700 700 700 
Number of countries 37 37 37 37 
Panel B: 2SLS (IV: Replaceable tasks) 
Percentile of changes in robot 
adoption 
-0.119 ∗∗ -0.003 -0.032 0.152 ∗∗∗ 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) 
Δ Investment to value added ratio 0.004 ∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 ∗∗∗ 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Δ (natural logarithm of) value 
added 
0.012 0.003 0.006 -0.019 ∗∗ 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
R 2 -0.020 0.001 -0.021 -0.059 
Observations 700 700 700 700 
Number of countries 37 37 37 37 
Notes : Robust standard errors in parentheses. Multi-way clustering by country and industry. The dependent variable is the change in the respective employment 
share between 2005 and 2015. The share of replaceable tasks in an industry is used as an instrument for robot adoption. Country fixed effects are included in all 
regressions and partialled out in the reported R 2 . 
∗ p < 0.1. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01 






















































p  ble decline in the sample to 277 observations because the EU KLEMS
ataset does not report ICT investment by industry for many EMTEs.
he estimated coefficient for the relation between robot adoption and
outine employment shares is smaller but remains negative and statisti-
ally significant in the OLS and IV regressions (see column 1 of Appendix
able A3 ). 30 
To avoid results being driven by certain countries, we inspect the pat-
ern of OLS residuals (depicted in Appendix Fig. A6 ). Furthermore, we
ook at the distribution of country-specific parameter estimates, which
e obtain by interacting robot adoption with a matrix of country dummy
ariables in our main OLS specification (see Appendix Fig. A7 ). There is
 cluster of high fitted values for Ireland (Appendix Fig. A6 , panel A) and
wo residuals from Romania and Sweden obtain a relatively high lever-
ge and are potential outliers (Appendix Fig. A6 , panel B). Moreover, the
ountry-specific estimation coefficients in Appendix Fig. A7 suggest co-
fficient estimates for Ireland, Lithuania, and Latvia deviate from other
ountries. We hence exclude these 5 countries as well as Portugal, which
aw somewhat different employment dynamics than the rest of our sam-
le, according to our descriptive analysis (cf. Appendix Fig. A1 ). Results
re reported in column (2) of Appendix Table A3 . Dropping these coun-
ries does not qualitatively affect our main result. 31 
Similarly, we also compute industry-specific coefficients for the re-
ationship between robot adoption and the share of routine jobs. Ap-
endix Fig. A8 suggests that the electricity, gas, and water supply sector30 Moreover, the change in the parameter estimate appears to originate from a 
ample composition effect and not from omitted ICT variables: re-estimating the 
aseline model with the 277 observations for which ICT data is available pro- 
uces the same coefficient for robot adoption as in the presence of ICT variables: 
0.033 ∗ ∗ ∗ . 
31 We also excluded several of those countries/country groups separately, with 
qually robust results. This also applies to excluding Japan from the analysis, 







ould be an outlier that potentially drives the overall result, together
ith the education and R&D sector, which saw different routine employ-
ent trends according to our descriptive analysis. We thus re-estimate
ur baseline regressions and sequentially omit these sectors. Columns
3) and (4) of Appendix Table A3 suggest our results are not driven by
hese sectors, although omitting the education and R&D sector in 2SLS
stimation pushes statistical significance of the robot adoption parame-
er slightly beyond the critical 10% level (for the null hypothesis of no
elationship). To check whether countries that account for the majority
f robots installed are driving our estimates, we also excluded Japan,
outh Korea, Germany, the PRC and the US from our estimates, leaving
he baseline estimate for robotization unaffected. For the same rationale,
e also excluded the high robot-adopting automotive and electronic in-
ustries (columns (5) and (6) of Appendix Table A3 respectively). All
arameter estimates for robot adoption where negative and statistically
ifferent from 0 and t-tests do not allow rejecting the null hypothesis
f equality of these parameter estimates with the baseline result (at the
0% level of statistical significance). 
We also investigated whether a sample split at the median (0.5) of
he percentile change in robot adoption affects our results. The results
ndicate that the parameter estimate for the slower adopters ( < 0.5) are
onsiderably higher but estimated with low precision, so that they are
ot statistically different from 0. Neither of the estimated OLS or IV
arameters for the sample split are statistically speaking different from
hose in the baseline result of column (2) in table 3 , in line with an
pproximately linear relationship suggested by panel (a) in Fig. 1. 32 32 We also examined results when clustering standard errors at the country 
evel and not clustering at all. The alternative treatment of standard errors does 
ot affect the statistical significance of the relation between robot adoption and 
he share of routine jobs in the OLS regressions and the coefficient ( 𝛽) is different 
rom zero at the 1% level of statistical significance in the 2SLS regressions. 
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Table 5 
Robot adoption and changes in the employment share of production workers. 
Panel A: OLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
No weight RII weight (global average) RII weight (U.S.) RII weight (Germany) RTI weight 
Percentile of changes in robot adoption -0.031 ∗ -0.066 ∗∗∗ -0.065 ∗∗∗ -0.058 ∗∗∗ -0.103 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) 
R 2 0.016 0.036 0.054 0.035 0.019 
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 
Panel B: 2SLS (IV: Replaceable tasks) 
Percentile of changes in robot adoption -0.083 ∗ -0.122 ∗∗ -0.143 ∗∗∗ -0.113 ∗∗ -0.318 ∗ 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.19) 
R 2 -0.018 0.013 -0.021 0.006 -0.033 
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 
Notes : Robust standard errors in parentheses. Multi-way clustering by country and industry. Dependent variable is the change in the employment share of production 
workers between 2005 and 2015, with weights indicated in the column header. In Panel B, the share of replaceable tasks in an industry is used as an instrument 
for robot adoption. Country fixed effects are included in all regressions and partialled out in the reported R 2 . 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01 
∗∗ p < 0.05 












































































.2.2. Robot adoption and production workers 
In Table 1 , production workers are categorized as having a high con-
ent of routine-manual tasks. Yet, production workers are typically la-
elled blue-collar workers. Hence, the relation between robots and a
eclining employment share of routine manual jobs could reflect a sub-
titution of robots for blue collar production workers, instead of a sub-
titution for routine tasks. 
It is hard to rule out such an alternative interpretation. Yet, for 24
ountries in our sample we are able to distinguish seven 2-digit ISCO
ccupations that together comprise the occupational grouping labelled
production workers’ (cf. Table 1 ). 33 The routine task-intensity for each
f these 2-digit occupations is provided by Autor et al. (2003) and, us-
ng an alternative approach, by Marcolin et al. (2019) . We use these to
reate a weighted average of the change in the employment share of
roduction workers. The weights we use are the routine intensity index
RII) from Marcolin et al. (2019) and the routine task intensity (RTI)
auged by Autor et al. (2003) . The task-intensity by occupation is re-
orted in Appendix Table A4 . Clearly, the seven occupations labelled
roduction workers are heterogeneous in the content of routine tasks. 
The first column of Table 5 regresses the change in the employment
hare of production workers on robot adoption. Results indicate a signif-
cant negative relation between robot adoption and changes in the share
f (routine manual task-intensive) production jobs. Subsequent columns
xamine the same relation, but here changes in the share of production
obs are calculated as a routine task-intensity weighted average change.
ccupations that have a higher content of routine tasks receive a greater
eight in this approach. 34 
Weighting by routine intensity strengthens the negative association
etween robotization and changes in the share of production jobs: the
esulting parameter estimates in columns (2)-(5) are larger compared
o column (1). This result is observed if we use as weights the global
verage routine intensity (RII) reported by Marcolin et al. (2019) , see
olumn (2), or the RII for the US or Germany (columns (3) and (4), re-
pectively). It is also observed if we weight occupations using the RTI33 The seven ISCO 2-digit occupations that can be distinguished are ISCO 88 
odes 71, 72, 73, 74, 81, 82, and 93. The countries for which we are able to 
ake this split are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fin- 
and, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, 
he Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
urkey, and the United Kingdom. 
34 The task-intensity measures are Pearson-transformed, i.e. centred at 0 with 
 standard deviation of 1. We added + 1 to the measure. Hence, an occupation 
ith mean routine intensity gets a weight of 1, a below-average routine intensity 
ccupation a lower weight, and an above-average routine intensity occupation 











rom Autor et al. (2003) , see column (5), although the parameter is es-
imated with less statistical precision in the OLS and 2SLS regressions.
verall, these results provide additional evidence that robot adoption
s related to a decline in the share of occupations that have a higher
ontent of routine tasks. 
.2.3. Controlling for long-term industry trends 
A remaining concern is that there could be a long-run decline in the
hare of routine tasks done by workers, which is more pronounced in
ndustries investing more in robots yet not driven by robotization per
e. A common way to examine this concern is to regress employment
utcomes from a pre-period on the period during which robots were
dopted. 
Ideally, we thus relate pre-period employment outcomes on the cur-
ent rise of robots. However, we are constrained by cross-country occu-
ations data which are available from 2000 onwards. By 2000, robots
ere already being installed ( Graetz and Michaels, 2018 ). Still, descrip-
ive statistics in Table 2 for the number of robots per thousand persons
mployed in 2005 and 2015 suggest they became ubiquitous from the
id-2000s onwards. 
In column (1) of Table 6 we therefore regress the change in the rou-
ine employment share between 2000 and 2005 on our post-2005 mea-
ure of robot adoption. We indeed find a relationship, although the coef-
cient is smaller and less precisely estimated compared to our baseline
esults (cf. column (2) of Table 3 ). 35 Pre-trend correlation is a necessary
ondition for unobserved sector heterogeneity, but it is not a sufficient
ondition to render identification invalid. This is partly because the pre-
rend does not pre-date the rise of robots. Yet, to control for longer-term
ndustry trends, we provide two additional estimation approaches: ex-
licitly accounting for pre-trends by including the change in the routine
mployment share between 2000 and 2005 as a lagged dependent vari-
ble and including industry fixed effects. 
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 add pre-trends to the regressions on
hanges in the routine employment share and the routine manual em-
loyment share, respectively (cf. column (2) of Table 3 and column (1)
f Table 4 ). We observe a positive autocorrelation in employment dy-
amics. Yet, robot adoption adds additional information beyond those
re-trends as the coefficient remains statistically significant. The esti-35 Note that the pre-trends in employment share changes cover a 5 year pe- 
iod. Estimated coefficients and standard errors thus have to be approximately 
ultiplied by a factor 2 to make them comparable with our main results for the 
0 year period from 2005 to 2015. When the pre-trends are included as lagged 
ependent variables (columns 2 and 3 of Table 6 ), they accordingly have to be 
ivided by 2. 
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Table 6 
Accounting for long-term industry trends. 
Panel A: OLS 











Percentile of changes in 
robot adoption 
-0.020 ∗∗ -0.044 ∗∗∗ -0.046 ∗∗∗ -0.016 ∗∗∗ -0.026 ∗∗∗ 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Change in dependent 
variable, 2000-2005 
0.174 ∗ 0.147 ∗ 
(0.10) (0.08) 
Industry Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes 
R 2 0.014 0.035 0.030 0.007 0.007 
Observations 700 700 700 700 700 
Panel B: 2SLS (IV: 
Replaceable tasks) 
Percentile of changes in 
robot adoption 
-0.053 ∗∗ -0.113 ∗∗ -0.114 ∗∗ 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) 




Industry Fixed Effects No No No 
R 2 -0.018 -0.012 -0.010 
Observations 700 700 700 
Notes : Robust standard errors in parentheses. Multi-way clustering by country and industry. The dependent variable is the change in the respective employment 
share over the respective period. The share of replaceable tasks in an industry is used as an instrument for robot adoption. Regressions include the change in the 
investment to value added ratio and the change in (the log of) value added between 2005 and 2015 as control variables. Country fixed effects are included in all 
regressions and partialled out in the reported R 2 . 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01 
∗∗ p < 0.05 


























































e  ated coefficient is comparable to the baseline results. Perhaps the most
onvincing evidence that the negative relationship between routine em-
loyment shares and robot adoption is not exclusively driven by spuri-
us industry dynamics can be found in columns (4) and (5) of Table 6 ,
here we add industry fixed effects to our OLS regressions. 36 This is
 restrictive model that assumes industry-specific time trends in lev-
ls and thus not only accounts for heterogeneous industry employment
rends but also removes a considerable degree of variation in the data
hat may be relevant for identification. Yet, the negative association be-
ween robotization and routine employment trends is still observed and
tatistically significant. 
.2.4. Global developments in robot adoption 
As discussed in Section 2 , advances in the technical ability of robots
ight relate to the “reshoring ” of jobs to advanced countries. For ex-
mple, Faber (2018) observes a decrease in labour demand in Mexico
ssociated with robot adoption in the United States. We explore this re-
ation in a cross-country context using two measures of robot adoption
hat vary across industries but not across countries. First, we take global
verages, defined as the cross-country mean of the percentile change in
obot adoption by industry. This reflects the idea that in an intercon-
ected world those industries with higher robot adoption will see faster
eclines in routine employment shares regardless of the location of pro-
uction. Second, we use robot adoption of U.S. industries to represent
lobal industry trends. 
Results are reported in Table 7 . In columns (1) and (2) the global av-
rages of industry-specific robot adoption is used. The regressions sug-
est a statistically significant and negative relation between changes in
he routine employment share and global trends in robot adoption. 37 In-
erestingly, the positive interaction between robot adoption and EMTEs36 We cannot estimate the model with industry fixed effects using 2SLS because 
he instrument only varies across industries. 
37 Using measures of robot adoption that vary across industries but not across 




hown in column (2) no longer makes up for the negative overall robot
doption parameter: the hypothesis that the sum of both parameters
dds up to 0 can be rejected at the 5% level of statistical significance.
his suggests that global developments in robot adoption impact labour
arkets in EMTEs. Note, however, this is not observed if we use robot
doption in U.S. industries to characterize global trends (see column
4)). 38 Nevertheless, these exploratory regressions provide suggestive
vidence for the potential relevance of global production networks and
ssociated job reshoring patterns due to automation, which remains an
nteresting area for further research. 
. Concluding remarks 
We study the relation between industrial robots and occupational
hifts by task content. Using a panel of 19 industries in 37 high-income
nd EMTEs from 2005-2015, we find that increased use of robots is as-
ociated with positive changes in the employment share of non-routine
nalytic jobs and negative changes in the share of routine manual jobs.
he patterns that we document are robust to instrumental variable es-
imation and the inclusion of various control variables, but they differ
cross levels of economic development: we observe a significant rela-
ion for high-income countries, but not in EMTEs. Finally, we do not
nd a significant relation between industrial robot adoption and aggre-
ate employment growth. This suggests that industrial robots did not
eplace jobs, but they did impact task demand and thus had disruptive
ffects on employment. 
Our analysis covered industrial robots, but much of the recent
obotic developments have been taking place in services, such as the
mergence of medical robots, logistics handling robots, and delivery bydoption and the average annual percentage growth in employment in specifi- 
ations with and without the interaction with a dummy for EMTEs. 
38 It is also not observed if we use robot adoption in German industries to 
haracterize global trends. 
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Table 7 
Global industry trends in robot adoption. 
Panel A: OLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Robot measure: Global average Global average U.S. U.S. 
Δ Routineemployment share Δ Routineemployment share Δ Routineemployment share Δ Routineemployment share 
Alternative measure robot adoption -0.084 ∗∗∗ -0.101 ∗∗∗ -0.045 ∗∗∗ -0.052 ∗∗∗ 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) 
Alternative measure robot adoption x 
dummy EMTE 
0.054 ∗∗∗ 0.052 ∗∗∗ 
(0.02) (0.02) 
R 2 0.034 0.039 0.039 0.043 
Observations 700 700 700 700 
Panel B: 2SLS (IV: Replaceable tasks) 
Alternative measure robot adoption -0.128 ∗∗∗ -0.152 ∗∗∗ -0.067 ∗∗∗ -0.080 ∗∗∗ 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) 
Alternative measure robot adoption x 
dummy EMTE 
0.089 ∗∗ 0.086 ∗∗ 
(0.04) (0.03) 
R 2 0.026 0.030 0.030 0.033 
Observations 700 700 700 700 
Notes : Robust standard errors in parentheses. Multi-way clustering by country and industry. The dependent variable is the change in the routine employment 
share between 2005 and 2015. Column headers indicate which type of global measure has been used to calculate industry-specific robot adoption. The share of 
replaceable tasks in an industry is used as an instrument for robot adoption. Regressions include the change in the investment to value added ratio and the change 
in (the log of) value added between 2005 and 2015 as control variables. Country fixed effects are included in all regressions and partialled out in the reported R 2 . 
∗ p < 0.1. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01 






















eans of drones. It is therefore likely that robots will continue to disrupt
abour markets and result in reallocation dynamics. Studying and under-
tanding the socio-economic consequences of these disruptions will be
mportant (see e.g. Dauth et al. 2019 ). Retraining and reskilling of work-
rs seems inevitable, which should spur a major rethinking about educa-
ional goals, lifelong learning, and developing the right skills ( Kim and
ark, 2020 ). 
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ppendix Fig. A1. Changes in employment shares by country 
and task type between 2005 and 2015. 
Notes : change in employment shares between 2005 
and 2015. For aggregation, industries included in the 
sample are weighted using their 2005 employment 
share within the sample for each country. Agriculture 
is omitted in the calculation for Ireland, which reports 
a sudden swing in the routine manual employment 
share (see Section 5.2.1 for robustness check excluding 
Ireland). Source: updated occupations database from 
Reijnders and de Vries (2018) by Buckley et al. (2020) . 
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Fig. A2. Changes in employment shares by in- 
dustry and task type between 2005 and 2015. 
Notes : change in employment shares by in- 
dustry between 2005 and 2015. Unweighted 
average changes. Source: updated occu- 
pations database from Reijnders and de 
Vries (2018) by Buckley et al. (2020) . 
Fig. A3. Robotization by country in 2005 and 2015. 
Notes : robot stock per thousand employees by country 
in 2005 (squares) and 2015 (triangles). Sources: robot 
stock from IFR and employment from Reijnders and de 
Vries (2018) updated by Buckley et al. (2020) . 
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Fig. A4. Robotization by industry in 2005 and 2015. 
Notes : robot stock per thousand persons employed by indus- 
try in 2005 (squares) and 2015 (triangles). Sources: robot 
stock from IFR and employment from Reijnders and de 
Vries (2018) updated by Buckley et al. (2020) . 
Fig. A5. Robotization by industry in the PRC and Germany, 
2015. 
Notes : robot stock per thousand persons employed by industry. 
Sources: robot stock from IFR and employment from Reijnders 
and de Vries (2018) updated by Buckley et al. (2020) . 
Table A1 
Industry codes. 
ISIC rev 3.1 code Short description Long description 
AtB Agriculture Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 
15t16 Food products Food, beverages and tobacco 
17t18 Textiles Textiles and textile 
19 Leather Leather, leather and footwear 
20 Wood products Wood and products of wood and cork 
21t22 Paper Pulp, paper, printing and publishing 
23 Petroleum Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 
24 Chemical Chemicals and chemical 
25 Plastic Rubber and plastics 
26 Non-metallic mineral Other non-metallic mineral 
27t28 Metal Basic metals and fabricated metal 
29 Machinery Machinery, not elsewhere classified (n.e.c.) 
30t33 Electronics Electrical and optical equipment 
34t35 Automotive Transport equipment 
36t37 Other Manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling 
C Mining Mining and quarrying 
E Utilities Electricity, gas and water supply 
F Construction Construction 
M Education, and R&D Education, and R&D 
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Fig. A6. Residual patterns for main OLS specification. 
Notes : Panel a plots the OLS residuals (deviation of predicted from actual value, vertical axis) against the fitted values from the OLS model (horizontal axis). Panel b 
plots the leverage (influence) every observation gets in the OLS regression, a measure of distance from the mean in the explanatory variables (vertical axis), against 
normalized squared residuals (horizontal axis). All values are based on column (2) in panel A of Table 3 . 
Fig. A7. Country-specific OLS coefficients. 
Notes : Fig 6 displays country-specific coefficients for an OLS regression model where we augment the specification in column (2) of Table 3 (panel A) with an 
interaction of robot adoption with country dummy variables. The distribution of those country-specific interactions with robot adoption is depicted in Figure 6(a) 
using a histogram and a kernel density estimator. Figure 6(b) displays the estimated coefficients by country, including their 95% confidence interval. 
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Fig. A8. Industry-specific OLS coefficients. 
Notes : Figure displays industry-specific coef- 
ficients for a regression model where we 
augment the specification in column (2) of 
Table 3 (panel A) with an interaction of robot 
adoption with industry dummy variables. The 
estimated coefficients by industry are depicted 
together with their 95% confidence interval. 
Table A2 
2SLS results for reaching and handling. 






Percentile of changes 
in robot adoption 
Percentile of changes in robot 
adoption 
-1.586 -0.134 ∗ -0.169 
(3.81) (0.08) (0.11) 
Percentile of changes in robot 
adoption x dummy EMTE 
0.149 
(0.10) 
Reaching and handling tasks 1.438 ∗∗∗ 
(0.43) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 129.47 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 11.44 
Kleibergen-Paap under 
identification test ( p -value) 
0.025 
R 2 -0.013 -0.047 -0.075 
Observations 700 700 700 700 
Number of countries 37 37 37 37 
Notes : Robust standard errors in parentheses. Multi-way clustering by country and industry. The dependent variable employment growth in column (1) is the 
average annual growth in employment for the period from 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable in columns (2)-(3) is the change in the routine employment 
share between 2005 and 2015. Column (4) reports the first stage for 2SLS estimation. Reaching and handling tasks are used as an instrument for robot adoption. 
Regressions include the change in the investment to value added ratio and the change in (the log of) value added between 2005 and 2015 as control variables. 
Country fixed effects are included in all regressions and partialled out in the reported R 2 . 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
∗ p < 0.1. 
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Table A3 
Robustness analysis. 
Panel A: OLS 



















changes in robot 
adoption < 0.5 
Percentile of 
changes in robot 
adoption > 0.5 
Perc. of Δ
robot adoption 
-0.033 ∗∗ -0.039 ∗∗∗ -0.052 ∗∗∗ -0.040 ∗∗ -0.047 ∗∗∗ -0.038 ∗∗ -0.158 -0.066 ∗ 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.04) 








R 2 0.044 0.044 0.032 0.019 0.021 0.012 0.011 0.029 
Observations 277 588 663 663 605 626 349 351 
Panel B: 2SLS (IV: Replaceable tasks) 
Perc. of Δ
robot adoption 
-0.085 ∗∗ -0.109 ∗∗∗ -0.134 ∗∗∗ -0.106 -0.130 ∗∗ -0.135 ∗∗ -1.367 -0.060 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.84) (0.21) 








R 2 -0.015 -0.065 -0.038 -0.022 -0.032 -0.052 -0.448 0.029 
Observations 277 588 663 663 605 626 349 351 
Notes : See Section 5.2.1 . Regressions for the percentile of changes in robot adoption (Perc. of Δ robot adoption) on changes in the routine employment share between 
2005 and 2015. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Multi-way clustering by country and industry. In column (1) the percentile of changes in information 
technology adoption (Perc. of Δ IT adoption) and the percentile of changes in communication technology adoption (Perc. of Δ CT adoption) are included as 
explanatory variables. Panel B uses the share of replaceable tasks in an industry as an instrument for robot adoption. Regressions include the change in the 
investment to value added ratio and the change in (the log of) value added between 2005 and 2015 as control variables. Country fixed effects are included in all 
regressions and partialled out in the reported R 2 . 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
∗ p < 0.1. 
Table A4 
Routine task-intensity of occupations grouped as ‘production workers’. 
ISCO88 code Description occupation RII (Global average) RII (U.S.) RII (Germany) RTI 
71 Extraction and building trades workers 1.031 1.209 0.955 0.815 
72 Metal, machinery and related trade work 1.269 1.209 0.955 1.457 
73 Precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trade workers 0.952 1.598 0.477 2.589 
74 Other craft and related trade workers 0.810 0.626 0.477 2.238 
81 Stationary plant and related operators 2.930 2.181 3.342 1.323 
82 Machine operators and assemblers 2.480 3.541 2.865 1.493 
93 Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport 2.886 2.375 3.342 1.449 
Notes : The routine intensity index (RII) is from Marcolin et al. (2019) and the routine task intensity (RTI) from Autor et al. (2003) . The measures are Pearson- 
transformed, i.e. centred at 0 with a standard deviation of 1. We added + 1 to the measure. Hence, an occupation with mean routine intensity gets a weight of 1, a 
below-average routine intensity occupation a lower weight, and an above-average routine intensity occupation a weight above 1. 
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